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 Drawing the Line for Democratic Choice: 
How the Petition Clause Can Restore a Citizen’s Right to Participate in 
Commission-Driven Redistricting 
 
Mateo Forero* 
ABSTRACT 
In this Article, I argue that commission-driven redistricting (and the “apolitical” process 
enshrined therein) frustrates a citizen’s right to meaningfully participate in electoral design. 
This right is fundamental, and has long been safeguarded by the First Amendment’s 
assertion that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging . . . the right of the people . . . to 
petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” Accordingly, I propose that courts use 
the Petition Clause as a constitutional remedy against rules that abridge substantive public 
input in commission-driven redistricting. To illustrate this claim, I analyze how one 
commonly adopted commission rule—the ex parte contacts prohibition—limits democratic 
choice.  Then, I examine how a court might deploy the First Amendment to repair the harm 
inflicted by the rule. 
INTRODUCTION   
 
 What does Bullwinkle have in common with a broken-winged pterodactyl? 
According to the courts, both resemble congressional districts that were oddly drawn 
to achieve suspicious electoral outcomes.1 Gerrymanders, as they are more commonly 
known, have long been the stuff of political intrigue. In large part, this is because 
state legislatures—the entities which usually produce them—are political by nature.2 
                                            
*  Associate, Balch & Bingham LLP. J.D., University of Alabama School of Law (May 2016); B.A., George 
Washington University: Elliott School of International Affairs (May 2013). Thank you to Professor Bryan 
Fair for his invaluable guidance in making this Article a reality. Thank you also to Alyssa Backlund, 
Ashley Batiste, Nic Campbell, Chase Chesser, Tyler Connor, Lyndsie Curry, Kathryn Davis, Gillian 
Richard, Stephanie Smith, Roenika Wiggins, and Aaron Smith for their editing suggestions and timely 
advice. I dedicate this research to my grandfathers, whose professional example has always been my 
inspiration. 
1  Diaz v. Silver, 978 F. Supp. 96, 113 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that the Bullwinkle shape of New York’s 
12th congressional district was unconstitutional because it diluted the effect of Latino votes); Fletcher v. 
Lamone, 831 F. Supp. 2d 887, 902 n.5 (describing Maryland’s 3rd congressional district as “reminiscent 
of a broken-winged pterodactyl, lying prostrate across the center of the State”). 
2  See Bernard Grofman & Thomas L. Brunell, Redistricting, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN 
ELECTIONS AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR 649, 651 (Jan E. Leighley ed., 2010) (noting that in most 
jurisdictions, redistricting “defaults to the legislature and the governor. For these states, redistricting is 
no different than passing state law. The state legislators pass new maps and rely on the governor to sign 
them into law”); WILLIAM J. KEEFE & MORRIS S. OGUL, THE AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE PROCESS: CONGRESS 
AND THE STATES 22 (10th ed. 2001) (“By and large, what the legislature brings to lawmaking is the power 
to represent the people and the authority to make social; what it can leave is its distinctive imprint on 
the policies recommended by others. Neither in what it brings to the process of making law nor in what 
it leaves in public policy is its power trifling”). 
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Indeed, the specter of partisan bias in redistricting is exactly what makes 
gerrymandering suspicious.3 But the close link between partisanship and electoral 
design is not a random one. Notably, Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution provides 
that the “times, places and manner of holding elections for . . . Representatives, shall 
be prescribed in each state by the legislature thereof . . . .”4 Thus, it is by design that 
our Founding Fathers placed the task of drawing electoral maps in the hands of those 
closest to the people. Theirs was an institutional choice rooted in the vision of a 
pluralist and federalist republic.5 
 That choice, however, was seriously undermined by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
one of its recent decisions. In Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent 
Redistricting Commission, the Court held that a state may draw congressional 
districts through a freestanding agency—even though the text of Article I, Section 4 
assigns that duty to its legislature.6 The Court reached this conclusion by 
interpreting “legislature” to mean “legislative power,” which includes prescription by 
direct democracy.7 Therefore, the Court found that an Arizona initiative assigning 
redistricting authority to an independent commission was a permissible exercise of 
the state’s “legislative power.”8 Rationalizing its decision, the Court stressed that 
                                            
3  Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L. REV. 593, 601–09 (2002) 
(arguing that partisan gerrymanders harm democratic accountability, individual rights, and group-based 
interests); and see Grofman & Brunell, supra note 2, at 663 (noting that “it is common journalistic wisdom 
that redistricting is an important cause of the extreme ideological polarization between the two parties 
found in the U.S. House of Representatives and in many state legislatures”). 
4  U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 4, cl. 2 (emphasis added). Although “legislature” has been interpreted broadly in 
Elections Clause jurisprudence, this is not without caveats. See Colorado General Assembly v. Salazar, 
541 U.S. 1093, 1095 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by Scalia, J., and Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[T]o be 
consistent with Article I, Section 4, there must be some limit on the State’s ability to define lawmaking 
by excluding the legislature itself in favor of the courts” (emphasis added)). 
5  James Madison, widely recognized as the philosopher of the Constitution, noted that “the House of 
Representatives, though drawn immediately from the people, will be chosen very much under the 
influence of that class of men whose influence over the people obtains for themselves an election into the 
state legislatures.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 287–88 (James Madison). Following Madison’s cue, 
Professor Franita Tolson has argued that partisan gerrymandering is federalism-reinforcing “because: 1) 
the states’ redistricting power links officials in separate spheres of government; and 2) this link, when 
combined with the loyalty commanded by the political party structure, allows the state to send an 
ideologically cohesive House delegation to Congress to influence federal policy.” Franita Tolson, Partisan 
Gerrymandering as a Safeguard of Federalism, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 859, 889 (2010). 
6  135 S. Ct. 2652, 2671 (2015) [hereinafter Arizona Legislature]. 
7  Id. at 2666–68. The Court’s interpretation was based on three cases that had previously given the 
Elections Clause its “functional” gloss. See also Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565 (1916); 
Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221 (1920); Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355 (1932). However, as the dissenters 
pointed out, those cases never stood for the proposition that the identity of a legislature changes clause-
by-clause in the Constitution. Arizona Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2682-83 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
8  Arizona Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2676. The initiative, known as Proposition 106, was introduced in 
response to decades of fruitless redistricting litigation. See Bruce E. Cain, Redistricting Commissions: A 
Better Political Buffer?, 121 YALE L.J. 1808, 1830–31 (2011) (providing a brief description of the 
controversies). Proposition 106 went on the ballot in the year 2000, and ultimately won by a margin of 
56.1% to 43-9%. BETSEY BAYLESS, ARIZ. SEC’Y OF STATE, 2000 ANNUAL REPORT 44 (2000), 
http://repository.asu.edu/attachments/105092/content/2000%20annual_report.pdf.  The vote broke along 
party lines, with groups like Common Cause, the League of Women Voters, and the Democratic Party as 
its major proponents. Cain, supra note 8, at 1831. Based on that reality, the Court’s characterization of 
Proposition 106 as a choice of the unified “people of Arizona” is strained at best. 
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removing legislatures from the line-drawing process curbs partisan entrenchment in 
state government.9 On that point, the Court noted that commissions like Arizona’s 
“have succeeded to a great degree in limiting the conflict of interest implicit in 
legislative control over redistricting.”10 
 The reasoning in Arizona Legislature, however, is problematic because it 
gainsays the Framers’ preference for a participatory (i.e., political) redistricting 
process. This preference was grounded on the fact that legislatures have long been 
considered adept at transforming disparate viewpoints into social consensus.11 Thus, 
it makes sense that Article I, Section 4 was written to give those institutions—instead 
of unelected bodies—the weighty task of electoral design. But Arizona Legislature 
imperiled that choice by allowing states to bypass the Constitution in the name of 
“nonpartisan” redistricting.12 Effectively, the Court invited states to vest redistricting 
power in commissions that are not accountable to the public, even though the costs 
to democracy are precipitous.13 In Arizona, for example, the state traded away a 
majoritarian consensus model for a system at risk of bureaucratic gridlock.14 This 
action hurt the citizens of Arizona the most, since they lost their ability to lobby 
candidly and directly for competing electoral maps, and they are now shut out by 
                                            
9  Arizona Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2674 (reasoning that commission-driven redistricting, as adopted by 
Arizona, is “in full harmony with the Constitution’s conception of the people as the font of governmental 
power”). What the Court failed to see, however, was that the compromise of our federal Constitution 
changed that “font” of power in order to serve superordinating structural interests (e.g., federalism, 
pluralism). See Tolson, supra note 5, at 898. In other words, the Elections Clause was the Framers’ 
method of protecting the people from their own hyper-majoritarian vices. 
10  Arizona Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2676. 
11  James Madison famously observed that legislatures “refine and enlarge the public views by passing them 
through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of 
their country and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or 
partial considerations . . . .” Within that model, he argued, “the public voice, pronounced by the 
representatives of the people, will be more consonant to the public good than if pronounced by the people 
themselves, convened for the purpose.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 76, 77 (James Madison). Over time, 
political scientists have confirmed the wisdom of Madison’s pluralist perspective. See, e.g., ROBERT A. 
DAHL, WHO GOVERNS? DEMOCRACY AND POWER IN AN AMERICAN CITY 223-56 (2d ed. 2005) (describing 
pluralism as an ordering theory of political science); THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM: THE 
SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES 22–66 (40th anniversary ed. 2009) (arguing that “interest group 
liberalism” captures the essence of modern legislative power).  
12  Arizona Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2658 (framing the question before it as primarily “concern[ing] an 
endeavor by Arizona voters to address the problem of partisan gerrymandering”). The dissent amply 
criticized this rationale, asserting that: “The majority today shows greater concern about redistricting 
practices than about the meaning of the Constitution. I recognize the difficulties that arise from trying 
to fashion judicial relief for partisan gerrymandering. But our inability to find a manageable standard in 
that area is no excuse to abandon a standard of meaningful interpretation in this area. This Court has 
stressed repeatedly that a law’s virtues as a policy innovation cannot redeem its inconsistency with the 
Constitution. ‘Failure of political will does not justify unconstitutional remedies.’” Id. at 2690 (Roberts, 
C.J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted). 
13  Id. at 2659. 
14  See Cain, supra note 8, at 1833 (“[B]ecause redistricting is a technical exercise, [Arizona’s] commissioners 
necessarily rely upon staff with geographic information system (GIS) skills (i.e., the ability to actually 
draw the lines), those with statistics training to do the Voting Right Act section 2 analysis, and legal 
counsel specializing in voting rights law. This sets up principal-agent problems based on asymmetries of 
information. In theory, the technical staff could steer commission decisions in a given direction by 
skewing the advice and options it gives to the commissioners”). 
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procedural rules “shielding” the commission from outside influence.15 The result has 
been a staggering loss of public access to an important field of policymaking. 
 Concerned by that outcome, I aim to explore how public access to redistricting 
can be restored in states that use (or are planning to adopt) the commission model. 
In this Article, I argue that commission-driven redistricting (and the “apolitical” 
process enshrined therein) frustrates a citizen’s right to meaningfully participate in 
electoral design.16 This right is fundamental, and it has long been safeguarded by the 
First Amendment’s assertion that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging . . . the 
right of the people . . . to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”17 
Accordingly, I propose that courts use the Petition Clause as a constitutional remedy 
against rules that abridge substantive public input in commission-driven 
redistricting.18 To illustrate this claim, I will analyze how one commonly adopted 
commission rule—the ex parte contacts prohibition—limits democratic choice.19 Then, 
I will examine how a court might deploy the First Amendment to repair the harm 
inflicted by the rule. 
 This Article proceeds in two substantive Parts. In Part II, I explore 
redistricting commissions from the institutional perspective. I first discuss the 
history of partisan gerrymandering and redistricting reform and then use that 
backdrop to analyze the comparative dynamics of independent commissions. Within 
that context, I survey and critique the ex parte contacts prohibition common to all 
independent commissions. My assessment reveals that—when compared to the 
legislative method—this rule limits public access to the redistricting process and 
                                            
15  The inability to interact one-on-one with redistricting commissioners inflicts a serious individual harm 
on the people of Arizona. Absent procedural barriers, political “relationships . . . develop from extensive 
informal contacts between lobbyists and government decision-makers. Both parties to the exchange of 
information . . . benefit from this closeness. For their part, government decision-makers obtain valuable 
information that helps them make decisions. As for lobbyists, closeness allows them access to the people 
who make the decisions that affect them and their clients.” ANTHONY J. NOWNES, INTEREST GROUPS IN 
AMERICAN POLITICS: PRESSURE AND POWER 121 (2d ed. 2013). 
16  My thesis focuses on a narrow issue: whether procedural barriers in the redistricting context abridge 
democratic-choice interests safeguarded by the First Amendment. But the same type of argument could 
be made about procedural barriers in any other area of public policy. This broader confluence of 
administrative law and First Amendment jurisprudence raises interesting questions, and merits more 
research than what is currently available. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Libertarian 
Administrative Law, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 393, 423–27 (2015). 
17  U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Framers believed that, by securing this right, “the people may . . . publicly 
address their representatives, may privately advise them, or declare their sentiments by petition to the 
whole body; in all these ways they may communicate their will.” See Proceedings in the House of 
Representatives, June 8, 1789, in 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 738 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834), reprinted in 
RONALD J. KROTOSZYNSKI, JR., RECLAIMING THE PETITION CLAUSE: SEDITIOUS LIBEL, “OFFENSIVE” PROTEST, 
AND THE RIGHT TO PETITION THE GOVERNMENT FOR A REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES 110 (2012). 
18  This argument relies on Professor Ronald Krotoszynski’s hypothesis that the Petition Clause carries an 
expansive right of access to the government. KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 17, at 170. In his seminal work 
on the subject, Professor Krotoszynski posits that “petitioners have a right to have their petitions be 
received and heard by the government,” and that “this right to be heard must [also] include a right of 
proximity to the government officials to whom a petition is addressed.” KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 17, at 
170. 
19  For an overview of the ex parte contacts rule in federal practice, see Sidney A. Shapiro, Two Cheers for 
HBO: The Problem of the Nonpublic Record, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 853 (2002). 
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dilutes the effect of citizen petitions on electoral design. Using that conclusion as a 
descriptive frame, I then proceed to make my normative First Amendment argument. 
 In Part III, I explore how the harm inflicted by the ex parte contacts rule 
implicates the First Amendment. I do this by measuring the values historically 
protected by the Petition Clause against the rule’s dilutive effect on those interests. 
Concluding that petitioning rights are materially infringed, I then contend that 
courts should subject the ex parte contacts rule to strict-scrutiny balancing. 
Borrowing from an analogous line of cases recognizing a right of access to court 
proceedings, I argue that this balancing reveals a constitutional infirmity. Therefore, 
I conclude that courts should invalidate the commission-specific rule as an invalid 
restraint on redistricting petitions. 
I. REDISTRICTING COMMISSIONS & DEMOCRATIC CHOICE 
 
 Animating this Article is the acknowledgment that redistricting is, by nature, 
a political endeavor. This Part gives depth to that proposition by: (1) tracing a 
narrative between voting rights litigation and commission-driven redistricting and 
(2) exploring the institutional problems created by the commission model. The 
discussion proceeds in three sections. First, I examine the events that prompted 
commission-based reforms—namely, the failed attempt by courts to police partisan 
gerrymandering. Then, I survey how those reforms have played out in the states and 
consider why the independent commissions adopted in six jurisdictions are 
constitutionally significant. Finally, I delve into one of the procedural rules that 
makes commission-driven redistricting problematic, and I analyze why mechanisms 
of its kind violate principles of pluralism. This last section will provide a staging point 
for the First Amendment claim I make in Part III. 
A. Jilted at the Bench: A Brief History of Partisan Gerrymandering Claims 
 
 History teaches us that commission-driven redistricting was born from a 
wrinkle in American jurisprudence. For over a century after the Constitutional 
Convention, courts respected the vesting of redistricting power in the legislative 
branch of each state.20 Justice Frankfurter forcefully articulated this position, writing 
in Colegrove v. Green that “courts ought not to enter this political thicket. The remedy 
for unfairness in districting is to secure State legislatures that will apportion 
properly, or to invoke the ample powers of Congress.”21 That remedy, however, 
                                            
20  For a historical overview of the voting rights debate prior to the 20th century, see Atiba R. Ellis, The Cost 
of the Vote: Poll Taxes, Voter Identification Laws, and the Price of Democracy, 86 DENV. U.L. REV. 1023, 
1036-50 (2009); and Samuel Issacharoff, Judging Politics: The Elusive Quest for Judicial Review of 
Political Fairness, 71 TEXAS L. REV. 1643, 1647-60 (1993). 
21  328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946) (plurality opinion). In Colegrove, a group of voters sought to enjoin an Illinois 
congressional election. Id. at 550. The Illinois district map had not been modified since 1901, and the 
voters argued that it entrenched population inequalities. Id. at 551. The Court, however, rejected the 
plea for judicial intervention—reasoning that only the states and Congress could provide a remedy. Id. 
at 552-53. 
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became quite elusive in the mid-twentieth century, as racial entrenchment and major 
shifts in demography distorted the political process.22 It became clear by the 1960s 
that state legislatures were using their redistricting power for invidious ends, and in 
Baker v. Carr, the Supreme Court finally intervened.23 The Baker Court held that 
challenges to electoral design were justiciable under the Fourteenth Amendment and 
concluded that courts had a duty to protect equality in voting rights.24 Thus, despite 
Justice Frankfurter’s criticism that the Court was spewing “empty rhetoric, sounding 
a word of promise to the ear, sure to be disappointing to the hope,”25 the Court 
confidently entered the political thicket. Not surprisingly, that adventure soon 
presented the Court with insurmountable challenges. 
 In a line of cases beginning with Reynolds v. Sims, the Court elaborated its 
“one person, one vote” rule, which required states to draw districts with equal 
populations.26 The Court later clarified that this equipopulation principle applied 
rigidly to congressional districts27—even though a group of dissenters warned that 
“legislatures intent on minimizing the representation of selected political or racial 
groups are invited to ignore political boundaries and compact districts so long as they 
adhere to population equality.”28 In a scathing critique of the decision in Wells v. 
Rockefeller, Justice Harlan objected that “the Court’s exclusive concentration upon 
arithmetic blinds it to the realities of the political process.”29 And similarly, in 
Karcher v. Daggett, Justice Powell noted that an “uncompromising emphasis on 
numerical equality” actually “encourages and legitimates even the most outrageous 
partisan gerrymanders.”30 These reproaches laid bare that the Court was lost in the 
political thicket: setting rules against quantitative vote dilution, while exacerbating 
                                            
22  See Michael P. McDonald, American Voter Turnout in Historical Perspective, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK 
OF AMERICAN ELECTIONS AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR 125, 132–35 (discussing how low rates of voter turnout 
were a result of Jim Crow policies in the South). 
23  369 U.S. 186, 201 (1962) (concluding that a 1901 Tennessee districting law violated equal protection). 
However, the writing was on the wall two years before Baker was decided. In Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 
U.S. 339 (1960), the Court had ruled that an Alabama municipal gerrymander violated the Fifteenth 
Amendment. 
24  Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan established the familiar six-factor test for 
determining “political questions.” Id. Upon applying those factors, he concluded that malapportionment 
claims could be addressed by the Court. Id. at 226. 
25  Id. at 270 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
26  377 U.S. 533 (1964) (holding that a state must “make an honest and good faith effort to construct districts, 
in both houses of its legislature, as nearly of equal population as is practicable”). In fact, the Reynolds 
rule was a derivative of two other cases decided that same Term. See Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 376–
78 (1963) (invalidating Georgia’s county-unit primary system, which used a vote-weighing mechanism 
similar to the federal electoral college); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1964) (holding that 
population disparities between Georgia’s congressional districts violated Article I, Section 2 of the 
Constitution). 
27  See Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 531 (1969) (invalidating Missouri’s congressional map); Wells 
v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542, 546–47 (1969) (invalidating New York’s congressional map). 
28  Wells, 394 U.S. at 555 (White, J., dissenting). 
29  Id. at 552 (Harlan, J., dissenting). His scathing dissent mocked the “magic formula” of “one man-one 
vote” as unworkable and ineffective at preventing partisan gerrymandering. Id. at 549–50. 
30  462 U.S. 725, 785 (1983) (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell’s critique arose from the Court’s decision 
to invalidate a New Jersey congressional plan that diluted Republican votes in Newark. Id. at 726. 
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problems in qualitative vote manipulation.31 However, because none of the Court’s 
cases through the 1970s presented the precise issue for decision, the problem of 
partisan gerrymandering remained largely unpoliced. 
 This reality forced the Court in Davis v. Bandemer to consider whether 
equipopulous districts drawn with a partisan motive were unconstitutional.32 In a 
six-to-three decision, the Bandemer Court held that such partisan gerrymanders 
were in fact justiciable.33 However, the majority disagreed on the standard to be 
applied—with Justice White proposing one test and Justice Powell offering the 
alternative.34 Justice White’s approach focused on two elements: the “consistent 
degradation” of voter influence and the “continued frustration” of the majority’s 
electoral will.35 Meanwhile, Justice Powell’s approach hinged on three factors: the 
shapes of voting districts and adherence to established political boundaries; any 
legislative history bearing upon partisan motivation; and evidence of a dilutive 
distribution of voters by party affiliation.36 Criticizing both tests as disingenuous, the 
dissent argued that partisan gerrymanders were simply nonjusticiable. Leading that 
view, Justice O’Connor predicted that courts would be unable to follow the tests set 
forth by the splintered majority.37 She asserted that the judiciary was unfit to make 
policy determinations about partisanship, and accordingly, that it should stay out.38 
 This lack of guidance from the Court made Bandemer claims impossible to 
prove, and decades of litigation failed to settle the matter.39 Unsurprisingly, by the 
                                            
31  See Mitchell N. Berman, Managing Gerrymandering, 83 TEX. L. REV. 781, 791–94 (2004) (describing in 
detail how the Court’s voting-rights jurisprudence evolved from 1965 to 1985). 
32  478 U.S. 109 (1986). In the earlier case of Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973), the Court had 
upheld a Connecticut redistricting plan against partisan gerrymandering claims. The Gaffney Court, 
however, failed to address the justiciability of the challenge. See id. at 737. Thus, in an important way, 
Bandemer was an attempt to correct the error. 
33  Id. at 123. Justice White, writing for a majority on justiciability, explained that qualitative vote 
manipulation was not a political question. Id. at 126. He reasoned that the Baker factors counseled in 
favor of judicial intervention—especially since the Court had succeeded in finding a “judicially 
manageable standard” in the ambit of quantitative dilution claims (i.e., one person-one vote). Id. at 126–
27. 
34  The six-vote majority agreed that partisan gerrymandering required proof of “both intentional 
discrimination against an identifiable political group and an actual discriminatory effect on that group.” 
Id. at 127. See also id. at 161 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). However, they divided 
on how to measure the requisite discriminatory effect. See Berman, supra note 30, at 796. 
35  Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 132–33. 
36  Id. at 173 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
37  Id. at 147 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (predicting that the proposed tests would devolve into “a requirement 
of roughly proportional representation for every cohesive political group”). 
38  Id. at 144 (O’Connor, J., concurring). This argument is buttressed by the fact that “nothing in our 
constitutional text or history supports the judgment that states act unconstitutionally by creating voting 
mechanisms and district lines that produce wholly disproportional representation.” Berman, supra note 
30, at 820. 
39  See, e.g., Duckworth v. State Admin. Bd. of Election Laws, 332 F.3d 769, 773–74 (4th Cir. 2003); Smith 
v. Boyle, 144 F.3d 1060, 1063–64 (7th Cir. 1998); La Porte Cty. Republican Cent. Comm. v. Bd. of 
Comm’rs of Cty. of La Porte, 43 F.3d 1126, 1128 (7th Cir. 1994); Session v. Perry, 298 F. Supp. 2d 451, 
474–75 (E.D. Tex. 2004) (per curiam); Martinez v. Bush, 234 F. Supp. 2d 1275, 1280 (S.D. Fla. 2002); 
Terrazas v. Slagle, 821 F. Supp. 1162, 1172–74 (W.D. Tex. 1993); Pope v. Blue, 809 F. Supp. 392, 395–97 
(W.D.N.C. 1992), summarily aff’d, 506 U.S. 801 (1992); Ill. Legislative Redistricting Comm’n v. LaPaille, 
782 F. Supp. 1272, 1275–76 (N.D. Ill. 1992); Hastert v. State Bd. of Elections, 777 F. Supp. 634, 653 (N.D. 
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time Vieth v. Jubelirer was decided in 2004, a plurality of justices were convinced that 
partisan gerrymandering was a nonjusticiable political question.40 Describing the 
proposed standards as “misguided when proposed,”41 and observing that they had 
produced “one long record of puzzlement and consternation,”42 the plurality voted to 
overrule Bandemer entirely.43 The plurality also rejected the four tests proposed by 
the Vieth dissenters—echoing Justice O’Connor’s admonition that it is “impossible to 
assess the effects of partisan gerrymandering,” difficult to establish whether a party 
has majority status, and “impossible to assure” that a party that does enjoy majority 
status “wins a majority of seats.”44 Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment, 
agreeing that the Bandemer test was inappropriate and noting that the approaches 
of the Vieth dissenters were questionable.45 However, he held out hope for a yet-to-
be-discovered method.46 As of 2016, the Court has not found that such a standard 
exists. 
 
B. Harnessing Politics to Fix Politics: The Rise of Commission-Driven 
Redistricting 
 
 In large part because of Vieth, commentators soured to the idea that courts 
could (and should) police partisan gerrymandering.47 Fueled by this frustration, 
policymakers began urging a more limited role for the judiciary in line-drawing 
controversies. The proposals for accomplishing this were varied, but importantly, all 
agreed that the political process should be “harnessed” to “fix” the conflict of interest 
                                            
Ill. 1991); Republican Party of Virginia v. Wilder, 774 F. Supp. 400, 403–05 (W.D. Va. 1991); Kenai 
Peninsula Borough v. State, 743 P.2d 1352, 1366–69 (Alaska 1987); Legislative Redistricting Cases, 629 
A.2d 646, 664–65 (Md. 1993); McClure v. Sec'y of Commonwealth, 766 N.E. 2d 847, 856–57 (Mass. 2002). 
40  541 U.S. 267, 290 (2004) (plurality opinion). In Vieth, Democratic voters challenged a Pennsylvania 
redistricting plan that strongly favored the Republican Party. Id. at 272–74. The controversy arose after 
the state lost two congressional seats to reapportionment, and was forced to redistrict. Berman, supra 
note 30, at 798. The plan was designed to hand Republicans fourteen of the state’s nineteen congressional 
seats—even though both parties enjoyed nearly equal support among the Pennsylvania electorate. Id. 
The legislature accomplished this by “slashing through municipalities and neighborhoods, splitting 
counties . . . [and] producing oddly misshapen districts.” Brief for Appellants at 12–13, Vieth v. Jubelirer, 
541 U.S. 267 (2004) (No. 02-1580). 
41  Vieth, 541 U.S. at 283 (plurality opinion). 
42  Id. at 282 (plurality opinion). 
43  Id. 
44  Id. at 287–89 (plurality opinion). For a detailed description of the four tests suggested by the Vieth 
dissenters, see Berman, supra note 30, at 799–802. 
45  Id. at 306–17 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). 
46  Id. at 308–12 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Instead, Justice Kennedy suggested that analyzing partisan 
gerrymanders through the First Amendment might yield a “more relevant” analysis. Id. at 314 (Kennedy, 
J., concurring) (“After all, these allegations involve the First Amendment interest of not burdening or 
penalizing citizens because of their participation in the electoral process, their voting history, their 
association with a political party, or their expression of political views.”). 
47  See Cain, supra note 8, at 1810–11 (“Some legal scholars and political scientists continue to urge the 
courts to intervene more deeply into partisan and incumbent gerrymandering issues, putting forward 
new refinements of formal redistricting criteria or fairness formulas for consideration. But others think 
this unwise and seek to lessen the current burden on the courts.”). 
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in legislature-driven redistricting.48 One commentator, for instance, proposed 
shaming politicians into drawing maps more “responsibly,”49 while others argued for 
accountability through the state referendum process.50 Most radically, however, a 
group of scholars suggested stripping elected officials of their redistricting duties 
entirely.51 It is in this milieu that commission-driven redistricting became an 
attractive policy mechanism. 
 Prompted by these proposals, states began establishing redistricting 
commissions with varying degrees of power.52 In a recent study of the existing models, 
Professor Bruce Cain describes commissions as being in one of four typologies: 
advisory, backup, political, or independent.53 I will briefly sketch each model here in 
order of least to most autonomous. 
First are advisory commissions, which can only recommend redistricting plans 
to the legislature and whose members are not insulated from partisan dynamics.54 
Eight states currently use the advisory commission model, and two of those 
jurisdictions serve as good illustrations of the categorical norm.55 In New York, for 
example, the legislature can adopt, amend, or ignore the commission’s proposal as it 
chooses.56 The commission itself consists of four legislators and two non-legislators 
who are appointed by party leaders in Albany.57 This formation stands in contrast to 
the Iowa commission whose five members cannot be in party positions, in elected 
office, or be related to members of the state legislature.58 On one hand, that quirk 
makes Iowa’s model more autonomous than New York’s; but the commission itself 
has little power. As in New York, the Iowa legislature may approve or reject the plans 
produced by the commission at will.59 
                                            
48  Heather K. Gerken & Michael S. Kang, The Institutional Turn in Election Law Scholarship, in RACE, 
REFORM, AND REGULATION OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS: RECURRING PUZZLES IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 86, 
86 (Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Heather K. Gerken & Michael S. Kang eds., 2011) (providing an overview of 
trends in the scholarly literature). 
49  Heather K. Gerken, Getting from Here to There in Redistricting Reform, 5 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 
1, 7 (2010). 
50  Michael S. Kang, De-Rigging Elections: Direct Democracy and the Future of Redistricting Reform, 84 
WASH. U. L. REV. 667, 668 (2006). 
51  See, e.g., Gordon E. Baker, Gerrymandering: Privileged Sanctuary or Next Judicial Target?, in 
REAPPORTIONMENT IN THE 1970S 122, 149 (Nelson W. Polsby ed., 1971); ROBERT G. DIXON, JR., DEMOCRATIC 
REPRESENTATION: REAPPORTIONMENT IN LAW AND POLITICS 380–84 (1968); Samuel Issacharoff, The 
Constitutional Contours of Race and Politics, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 45, 68 (1995); Jeffrey C. Kubin, Note, 
The Case for Redistricting Commissions, 75 TEX. L. REV. 837, 849–50 (1997). 
52  See JUSTIN LEVITT, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO REDISTRICTING 20–22 (2010) 
(cataloguing the reform trends emerging throughout the United States). 
53  Cain, supra note 8, at 1813. 
54  Id. at 1813–15. 
55  The eight states are Iowa, Maine, New York, Ohio, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Virginia. See Justin 
Levitt, All About Redistricting: Professor Justin Levitt’s Guide to Drawing the Electoral Lines, LOYOLA 
LAW SCHOOL, http://redistricting.lls.edu/who.php (last visited Dec. 10, 2015). 
56  See N.Y. LEGIS. LAW § 83-m(5) (Consol. 2014 & Supp. 2016) (“The primary function of the task force is to 
compile and analyze data, conduct research for and make reports and recommendations to the 
legislature, legislative commissions and other legislative task forces.”). 
57  See id. § 83-m(2) (describing the appointment process of the legislative task force members). 
58  IOWA CODE § 42.5(2) (2014 & Supp. 2016). 
59  See id. § 42.6(3) (explaining the duties of the commission). 
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Next are backup commissions, which can only exercise conditional (but 
independent) authority and whose members are not insulated from partisanship.60 
Eight states currently use backup commissions, albeit for different kinds of 
districts.61 However, in all of those jurisdictions, redistricting power is conferred only 
if a legislature fails to draw the lines.62 As Professor Cain notes, the mere existence 
of this trigger “can be consequential . . . . [because] knowing that stalemated 
redistricting negotiations would throw the matter to a backup commission can alter 
the legislative bargaining strategies in certain circumstances.”63 This phenomenon 
can be readily observed in states like Connecticut whose commission has a mandated 
bipartisan composition.64 When the partisan divide is close to fifty-fifty in the 
legislature, there may be more frequent recourse to the commission. But when the 
legislature is dominated by one party, the majority may wish to avoid a commission-
enacted plan. 
At a third level are political commissions, which possess initial line-drawing 
authority and are headed by panels that proportionally represent interests in the 
state.65 Seven jurisdictions use this model with variations on composition and scope 
of power.66 However, one feature common to all political commissions is their focus 
on balanced representation.67 Some states achieve this by allocating membership 
through statewide offices (e.g., the Governor or Attorney General), while others 
mandate bipartisan and multi-geographic officeholders.68 New Jersey’s institutional 
                                            
60  Cain, supra note 8, at 1815. 
61  Illinois, Maryland, Mississippi, Oklahoma, Oregon, and Texas use a backup commission only for state 
districts. See ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 3; MD. CONST. art. III, § 5; MISS. CONST. art. XIII, § 254; OKLA. CONST. 
art. V, § 11A; OR. CONST. art. IV, § 6; TEX. CONST. art. III, § 28 (explaining the composition or role of the 
backup commissions). Meanwhile, Indiana uses its backup only for congressional districts. But see IND. 
CODE ANN. § 3-3-2-2 (LexisNexis 2012) (explaining the establishment of redistricting commissions for 
congressional districts). The only state to use its backup for state and congressional districts is 
Connecticut. See generally CONN. CONST. art. III, § 6(b) (explaining the role of the backup commission). 
62  See Cain, supra note 8, at 1815 (arguing that commissions’ initial lack of line-drawing power is “a serious 
deficiency”). 
63  Id. To illustrate this point, Professor Cain presents a hypothetical situation: if a backup commission has 
a different partisan composition than the legislature, the risk of losing authority over the matter will 
always “give the majority party leadership more leverage over individual majority party members (i.e., 
‘hold this up by insisting on your selfish demands and we lose control of the process to the other party’).” 
Id. 
64  See CONN. CONST. art. III, § 6(b) (requiring that each party leader appoint two commissioners, and then 
agree on a ninth “citizen commissioner”). 
65  See Cain, supra note 8, at 1816 (explaining that political commissions are more independent than 
advisory or backup commissions). 
66  Arkansas, Colorado, Ohio, Pennsylvania and Missouri use political commissions for state redistricting. 
See ARK. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; COLO. CONST. art. V, § 48; MO. CONST. art. III, §§ 2, 7; OHIO CONST. art. XI, 
§ I; PA. CONST. art. II, § 17(h). Meanwhile, the commissions in New Jersey and Hawaii draw both 
congressional and state lines. But see HAW. CONST. art. IV, § 2; N.J. CONST. art. II, § 2, ¶ 1. 
67  Cf. Sam Hirsch, Unpacking Page v. Bartels: A Fresh Redistricting Paradigm Emerges in New Jersey, 1 
ELECTION L.J. 7 (2002) (observing that “the entire New Jersey experience—from negotiating the district 
configurations, to deliberating within the Commission, to defending the new plan in court—highlights 
the significance of unity among” state factions and communities of interest). 
68  Colorado’s model is noteworthy on this count. The state constitution requires that no more than four 
commissioners can live in the same congressional district. See COLO. CONST. art. V, § 48. But see Cain, 
supra note 8, at 1816 n.29 (other states only require bipartisanship.). 
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framework is an example of the latter approach. There, the redistricting commission 
“consists of equally sized contingents of Democratic and Republican appointees 
chaired by a tiebreaking member selected by the commissioners themselves or the by 
the state supreme court if the commissioners cannot agree.”69 These commissioners 
must agree on New Jersey’s state and congressional districts, and they are supposed 
to do so in a manner that keeps elections competitive.70 As it were, Professor Cain 
believes the New Jersey model should be emulated in other states.71 
Finally, at the highest level of autonomy are independent commissions. As 
Professor Cain notes, independent commissions are the “culmination of a reform 
effort” aimed at completely eradicating the risks of partisan gerrymandering.72 He 
argues that these systems are in a league of their own because they: (1) are completely 
isolated from elected officials and (2) are able to put district lines in place without 
legislative approval.73 Because of their novelty and because of the Supreme Court’s 
stamp of approval in Arizona Legislature,74 independent commissions are likely to 
proliferate beyond the six states that currently use them (Alaska, Arizona, California, 
Idaho, Montana, and Washington).75 Thus, studying the commissions that already 
exist can provide important insights about the landscape and future of redistricting 
reform. 
In that endeavor, Professor Cain’s analysis again sheds some light on the 
nuances. For example, he observes that Washington’s approach is the least 
independent because it gives “party leaders the power to appoint commissioners 
subject to certain restrictions,” and it grants the legislature a “limited ability to 
amend the commission’s recommended districts.”76 Meanwhile, he catalogues Alaska, 
Idaho, and Montana as intermediate states because they “do not give their 
legislatures any opportunity to amend the commission’s plans,” but they do “allow 
                                            
69  Cain, supra note 8, at 1817. 
70  Id. at 1838 (describing the “informal” bargaining process that occurs among New Jersey’s commissioners 
during redistricting). 
71  See id. at 1839–41 (arguing that New Jersey’s bargaining process should become a formalized procedure 
in other commission frameworks). 
72  Id. at 1817 (observing that the object of the independent commission model is to eliminate “legislators’ 
ability to choose the district lines they run in (sometimes simplistically characterized as elected officials 
choosing voters rather than voters choosing their representatives). The term for this problem—i.e., 
legislators drawing district lines that they ultimately have to run in—is legislative conflict of interest 
(LCOI)”). 
73  Id. These features sound similar to those which characterize political commissions. However, they are 
different in substance: the independent commission—at least in theory—operates entirely outside the 
sphere of horse-trading and tug-of-war prevalent in state capitals. 
74  See Arizona Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2677 (“The people of Arizona turned to the initiative to curb the 
practice of gerrymandering and, thereby, to ensure that Members of Congress would have ‘a [sic] habitual 
recollection of their dependence on the people.’ In so acting, Arizona voters sought to restore ‘the core 
principle of republican government,’ namely, ‘that the voters should choose their representatives, not the 
other way around.’” (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 57, at 350 (James Madison)) and Berman, supra note 30, 
at 781)). 
75  See ALASKA CONST. art. VI, § 8–10; ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, Pt. 2, § 1(14); CAL. CONST. art. 21, § 2; IDAHO 
CONST. art. 3, § 2(a); MONT. CONST. art. V, § 14; WASH. CONST. art. II, § 43(1). 
76  Cain, supra note 8, at 1819; see also WASH. CONST. art. II, § 43(7); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 44.05.100 
(2012). 
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legislative leaders to make . . . appointments subject to restrictions by elected 
officials, political party leaders, and lobbyists.”77 Finally, he classifies Arizona and 
California as the most independent systems because their commissions are wholly 
autonomous, and their nomination processes are increasingly merit-based.78 In 
Arizona, for example, the Commission on Appellate Court Appointments identifies 
potential candidates for office;79 in California, legislative leaders can only strike 
nominees from the candidate pools prepared by the State Auditor.80 
 In the aggregate, these reforms highlight a continued effort to eradicate 
legislative conflicts of interest from redistricting. However, that goal bears false 
promise. As Professor Cain aptly observes, “a core problem for U.S. redistricting 
reform is that the system of nonpartisan expertise is weaker (even, sadly, in electoral 
administration) than in the other Anglo-American democracies that also use single 
member district rules.”81 Thus, the idea that independent commissions can cure what 
Vieth could not is plainly unrealistic. 
Indeed, not only is the goal illusory, its implementation presents a threat to 
the pluralist mode of policymaking.82 By erecting institutional barriers between the 
redistricting and legislative processes, citizens in commission-driven states are 
placed at two degrees of separation from electoral design. That separation, in turn, is 
deepened by the reality that most commissions have to abide by the administrative 
code of their home states.83 This is because administrative codes are normally 
designed to mitigate outside pressures on rulemaking and adjudication.84 In practice, 
                                            
77  Cain, supra note 8, at 1819, and see ALASKA CONST. art. VI, § 8; MONT. CONST. art. V, § 14; IDAHO CODE § 
72-1502 (2006). 
78  Cain, supra note 8, at 1819. 
79  See ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1(3)–(8). 
80  See CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(d); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8252(b)-(g) (West 2014); Cain, supra note 8, at 1824 
(noting that the desired effect of this policy was to create “a bipartisan panel of citizens, unconnected to 
incumbent legislators and relying on neutral criteria, [who] would create fair and competitive district 
boundaries without explicit instructions to do so and without using political data”). 
81  Cain, supra note 8, at 1820–21; see Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Our Electoral Exceptionalism, 80 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 769, 780–86 (2013) (surveying non-American institutional models of election administration). 
82  To understand this point, consider the mechanics of redistricting reform. In adopting a commission 
model, a state hopes to impact a dependent variable (partisan-motivated redistricting) by tweaking a 
group of independent variables (e.g., institutions, personnel). When it makes those changes, however, the 
state also impacts other output coefficients tied to the same variables—namely responsiveness to public 
needs. The result is a redistricting process that takes in neither downstream (i.e., legislator) nor 
upstream (i.e., citizen) inputs. This creates an information gap that ends up being filled by intra-stream 
(i.e., bureaucratic) priorities. Cf. Nikolaos Zahariadis, Ambiguity and Multiple Streams, in THEORIES OF 
THE POL’Y PROCESS 25, 31 (Paul A. Sabatier & Christopher M. Weible eds., 3d ed. 2014) (discussing how 
policy outputs are impacted by the confluence of input “streams”); Ellen M. Immergut, Institutional 
Constraints on Policy, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PUB. POL’Y 557, 565–68 (Michael Moran, Martin Rein 
& Robert E. Goodin eds., 2006) (discussing how governmental structure affects policy outputs). 
83  See Daniel P. Tokaji, Public Rights and Private Rights of Action: The Enforcement of Federal Election 
Laws, 44 IND. L. REV. 113, 117 (2010) (noting that “election administration remains mostly a matter of 
state law and local practice,” and that “authority is largely devolved . . . to thousands of local election 
officials at the state and local level”). 
84  See Sidney Shapiro, Elizabeth Fisher & Wendy Wagner, The Enlightenment of Administrative Law: 
Looking Inside the Agency for Legitimacy, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 463 (2012) (“The job of public 
administration is not limited to aggregating the preferences of interest groups when normative issues 
present themselves. Instead, as Brian Cook points out, public administration must be a ‘political 
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this means citizens of some jurisdictions have no way to directly and openly share 
their views with the officials that matter.85 It is precisely this mix of institutional and 
procedural isolation that raises grave concerns about the public’s ability to 
meaningfully participate in redistricting. 
C. Procedural Dysfunction: Independent Commissions and the Ex Parte 
Contacts Rule 
 
 To illustrate my point about the threat to pluralism from commission-based 
redistricting, it is useful to study how one procedural rule common to all independent 
commissions harms democratic choice. Take, for instance, the rule barring 
redistricting commissioners from engaging in ex parte contacts with citizens.86 
In California, the state legislature directs that “commission members and staff 
may not communicate with or receive communications about redistricting matters 
from anyone outside of a public hearing.”87 It further stipulates that “the commission 
shall establish and implement an open hearing process for public input and 
deliberation that shall be subject to public notice and promoted through a thorough 
outreach program.”88 Similarly, in Washington, the state legislature directs the 
commission to comply with the “Administrative Procedure Act, chapter 34.05 RCW.”89 
And that law, in relevant part, provides that commissioners “may not communicate, 
directly or indirectly, regarding any issue in the proceeding, with any person not 
employed by the agency who has a direct or indirect interest in the outcome of the 
proceeding, without notice and opportunity for all parties to participate.”90 
These commands are just examples, but they are representative of the ex parte 
contacts prohibition used by most states. Indeed, the rule is commonly adopted by 
                                            
institution’ that ‘helps to create, to express, and to realize a nation’s public purposes.’”) (citing BRIAN J. 
COOK, BUREAUCRACY AND SELF-GOVERNMENT: RECONSIDERING THE ROLE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN 
AMERICAN POLITICS 16 (1996)). 
85  Of course, citizens may participate in other indirect or diminished ways (e.g., by attending public 
hearings held by the commission). But the mere absence of alternative avenues for substantive 
participation in redistricting is what creates an individual-rights problem. 
86  Although state administrative codes differ in their implementation of the ex parte contacts rule, they 
largely follow the federal example. Cf. Ex Parte Communications in Informal Rulemaking Proceedings 
(Recommendation 77-3), 1 C.F.R. § 305.77 (2001) (listing the advantages of restraining ex parte 
communications, including reducing the possibility of unfair influence over decision makers, and 
affording interested parties opportunity to respond to information relied upon in the decision-making 
process). 
87  CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8253(a)(3) (West 2014). The rule was passed as part of Proposition 11, which 
established the state’s independent redistricting commission by initiative. See Cain, supra note 8, at 
1823. 
88  CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8253(a)(7) (West 2014). This provision was meant to link the state’s ex parte contacts 
rule to California’s open-meeting laws. See Michael Halberstam, Beyond Transparency: Rethinking 
Election Reform from an Open Government Perspective, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1007, 1048–51 (2015). 
89  WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 44.05.080(1) (West 2014). This directive was enacted as part of a legislative 
package following the redistricting amendments to the state constitution. WASH. CONST. art. II, § 43(4) 
(“The legislature shall enact laws providing for the implementation of this section, to include . . . 
additional standards to govern the commission”). 
90  WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 34.05.455(2) (West 2014); see also William R. Andersen, The 1988 Washington 
Administrative Procedure Act—An Introduction, 64 WASH. L. REV. 781, 811–813 (1989). 
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redistricting commissions because it is key to accomplishing a “bias free” line-drawing 
process.91 On its face, this objective seems defensible; however, use of the rule also 
constricts the ability of citizens to interact candidly and personally with their 
commissioners. In effect, the prohibition creates a catch-22: a “neutral” redistricting 
process has been created but only at the expense of the constituent-representative 
relationship. Intuitively, that outcome seems more harmful to representative 
democracy than having a less-than-perfect method for drawing electoral maps. 
To understand why, consider how constituents interact with officials in 
commission-based states. Because of the ex parte contacts rule, if an individual wishes 
to propose (or give feedback on) a redistricting plan, he may only do so in the sterile 
environment of a public hearing.92 As a practical matter, this requirement may force 
the citizen to dilute or modify his position out of fear of retaliation from other 
members of the public.93 Alternatively, the requirement may cause commissioners to 
be less receptive to constituent input than if they were listening in a more informal—
or even private—setting.94 In either scenario, the citizen suffers from an inability to 
impact the redistricting process at an organic and substantive level. From that 
institutional perspective, the ex parte contacts rule discourages participation in a field 
that should be most open to the people it affects—that is, the voters.95 Indeed, the 
                                            
91  See Ron Levy, Regulating Impartiality: Electoral-Boundary Politics in the Administrative Arena, 53 
MCGILL L.J. 1, 23–24 (2008) (observing that in a “recommendation designed to keep influential partisans 
from exercising power behind closed doors, Common Cause proposes the creation of new state 
readjustment commissions whose members would ‘be prohibited from all ex-parte communications’ with 
elected officials and lobbyists”). 
92  I call the public hearing a “sterile environment” because it turns out to be useless for deliberative 
policymaking. At least one study in public administration has documented this conclusion: “The most 
ineffective technique is the public hearing. Public hearings do not work. Low attendance at public 
hearings is often construed as public apathy or silent approval of the status quo. In actuality, low 
attendance is more likely to be related to the structure of public hearings. Administrators recognize that 
the structure of public hearings and public meetings prohibits meaningful exchange. As one 
administrator said, ‘The public hearing is not about communicating, it is about convincing.’ . . . An activist 
suggested that the public hearing was window dressing, ‘We have these hearings so they can check off 
on their list that they’ve had their citizen participation. . . . It’s participation out of the fear that they are 
going to look bad.’” Cheryl Simrell King et al., The Question of Participation: Toward Authentic Public 
Participation in Public Administration, 58 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 317, 323 (1998). 
93  Cf. Carson Hilary Barylak, Reducing Uncertainty in Anti-SLAPP Protection, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 845, 845 
(2010) (“Public participation has long been considered an essential element of effective governance, [and] 
resolution of broad social problems. . . . The values underlying First Amendment protections and 
pluralism demand that individuals and groups have the opportunity to make their voices heard, without 
the threat of retaliation by those equipped with greater financial or institutional power.”). 
94  See King et al., supra note 89, at 319 (“Many administrators are, at best, ambivalent about public 
involvement or, at worst, they find it problematic . . . . As a result, although [they] view close relationships 
with citizens as both necessary and desirable, most of them do not actively seek public involvement. If 
they do seek it, they do not use public input in making administrative decisions.”). 
95  At least one commentator has observed that partisan gerrymandering actually serves voter preference. 
See Nathaniel Persily, In Defense of Foxes Guarding Henhouses: The Case for Judicial Acquiescence to 
Incumbent-Protecting Gerrymanders, 116 HARV. L. REV. 649, 670–73 (2002) (arguing that legislature-
driven redistricting safeguards popular incumbents and ensures better governance). 
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rule ensures that redistricting will be conducted in isolation and with primarily 
bureaucratic priorities in mind.96 
 Compare that scenario to how an individual in a state with legislative 
redistricting participates in electoral design. Unlike the officials in commission-based 
states, legislators considering district maps are not bound by an ex parte contacts 
prohibition.97 Therefore, they are able to meet individually and privately with 
constituents about their redistricting concerns and priorities. Because each legislator 
is answerable to the citizens with whom she meets, she is more likely to take these 
critiques seriously.98 This practice, in turn, motivates legislators to advocate for their 
constituents and use their views as bargaining chips negotiating with each other.99 
Cognizant that their voice has weight in the legislative arena, individuals are more 
willing to share their unvarnished opinions about potential redistricting plans. At its 
core, this interaction is a positive outcome—since greater input in the process yields 
electoral maps that are more comprehensive and representative. 
 In a nutshell, the latter example represents pluralism at work. Contrary to the 
rationale in Arizona Legislature, this process was the one our Framers had in mind 
when they drafted Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution.100 The fact that 
independent commissions with unworkable ex parte contact rules are 
countermanding that preference should be of deep constitutional concern. It is to that 
concern that I turn my attention next. 
  
                                            
96  See id. at 678 (“With nonpartisan expertise . . . often comes detachment from the policy goals of the 
political branches. For example, it is quite typical for nonpartisan experts to attempt to make district 
lines as coterminous with political subdivision boundaries as possible. Pursuing such a goal, however, 
often conflicts with attention to communities of interest that straddle such boundaries and with a state’s 
public policy goal of regionalism in uniting cities and suburbs”). 
97  In fact, the hallmark of the legislative process is that representatives can freely communicate with 
constituents. This information-sharing function is central for democratic accountability: if legislators fail 
to heed public demands, they will be met with retaliation at the ballot box. See STONE & BUTTICE, Voters 
in Context: The Politics of Citizen Behavior, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN ELECTIONS AND 
POLITICAL BEHAVIOR, supra note 2, at 555, 561. 
98  See Cain, supra note 8, at 1817 n.29 (“I can attest from my own experience as a redistricting consultant 
that legislators are often pressured by their constituents and supporters to shape district lines in 
particular ways and that legislators are often loath to ignore their demands for fear of the electoral or 
fundraising consequences”). 
99  See Persily, supra note 92, at 679 (“Legislative bargains in the redistricting process are not completely 
detached from others that occur throughout a legislative session. Through redistricting, legislatures not 
only make the tough value-laden decisions as to how communities should be represented, but they create 
service relationships between representatives and constituents that fit into larger . . . policy programs”). 
100  See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
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II. RESTORING PUBLIC ACCESS TO REDISTRICTING 
 
 In Part II, I showed how the ex parte contacts rule undermines pluralism in 
redistricting policy. In Part III, I contend that this harm to democratic choice also 
triggers a redressable constitutional violation.101 Specifically, I argue that the ex 
parte contacts rule—when used by redistricting commissions—runs afoul of the First 
Amendment right “to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”102 In 
making this claim, I contend that: (1) the Petition Clause safeguards a citizen’s right 
to influence electoral design and (2) that the ex parte contacts rule abridges that right 
by impeding and diluting meaningful participation in commission-driven 
redistricting. 
 This discussion proceeds in three sections. First, I define the scope of the 
Petition Clause coverage by examining its historical context. I then use that history 
to measure whether procedural barriers in redistricting trigger the Clause’s 
protection. Second, finding that the ex parte contacts rule materially inhibits First 
Amendment interests, I argue that courts should subject the provision to a strict 
scrutiny balancing test. Third, I forecast this balancing analysis by analogizing to a 
line of cases that enforce public access to court proceedings. Using that framework, I 
conclude that the ex parte contacts prohibition cannot survive strict scrutiny. On one 
hand, the rule inhibits a process that is historically and functionally reliant on 
democratic input; but on the other hand, a state’s interest in “neutral” redistricting 
is not compelling enough to justify the burden on citizen petitions. 
A. Constitutional Trigger: The Historically Recognized Right to Influence the 
Government 
 As is customary in First Amendment jurisprudence, I begin with an inquiry 
into what interests are safeguarded by the Petition Clause.103 Normally, this inquiry 
would be guided by the Supreme Court’s authoritative precedents. However, this is 
                                            
101  This thesis relies on Professor Krotoszynski’s contention that the Petition Clause codifies a justiciable 
and enforceable right of access to the government. See KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 16, at 170. 
102  U.S. CONST. amend. I. It is no answer to impaired advocacy that a citizen can still petition a commission 
through the formal administrative process. See KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 16, at 175 (“The availability of 
one means of petitioning the government should not imply the absence of other means of engaging in 
petitioning activity that would-be petitioners might prefer to use”). For one, participating in that process 
may not actually provide the type of access the citizen desires. See KEN GODWIN ET AL., LOBBYING AND 
POLICYMAKING: THE PUBLIC PURSUIT OF PRIVATE INTERESTS 40 (2013). Plus, the Supreme Court has 
warned against this precise argument. See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 183 (1972) (holding that “the 
Constitution’s protection is not limited to direct interference with fundamental rights,” and that 
procedural barriers can form “an impermissible, though indirect, infringement of . . . [those] rights”). 
103  See generally Gregory P. Magarian, The Marrow of Tradition: The Roberts Court and Categorical First 
Amendment Speech Exclusions, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1339, 1342–45 (2015) (describing the history and 
current state of the “trigger test” in First Amendment law).  
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impractical here, since the judiciary has long treated the Petition Clause as a dead 
letter.104 Instead, I resort to the academic literature for more concrete guidance. 
In his influential book on petitioning, Professor Ronald Krotoszynski suggests 
that “like the Free Speech Clause, the Petition Clause should be interpreted and 
applied dynamically or purposively—the federal courts should identify the core 
purpose, or purposes, of the Petition Clause and then use the clause to advance and 
secure them.”105 To that end, considering the Clause’s “historical origins and past 
meaning should be useful, perhaps even essential, to identifying and securing its 
proper place in contemporary constitutional law.”106 Following that instruction, I aim 
now to define the Petition Clause through its historical antecedents.107  
 Petitioning first became a significant political activity in the thirteenth century 
when it was codified in the Magna Carta as a right of the nobility enforceable against 
King John.108 By the reign of Edward III in the mid-1300s, petitioning was a common 
practice exercised by noblemen and knights.109 The Crown had a formalized structure 
for receiving petitions, and this structure consisted of in-person presentations by the 
landed elite on behalf of the English people.110 This model was followed by Parliament 
in the sixteenth century as its representative power grew.111 The House of Commons 
would receive grievances from the citizenry, and accordingly, the House petitioned 
the Crown for changes in the general law.112 As Parliament itself became the source 
of prescriptive power, citizen petitions were read and debated directly.113 And by the 
time of the English Revolution in 1688, petitioning was seen as a birthright of all 
                                            
104  As I describe in Part III.B, the Supreme Court has invoked the Petition Clause before. However, those 
precedents have been limited to the circumstances they control, and have failed to recognize the Clause’s 
independent force. See KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 16, at 157. 
105  Id. at 81. 
106  Id. at 82. 
107  Much of the historical analysis in this section draws from my previous research on the Petition Clause. 
See generally Mateo Forero, Distorting Access to Government: How Lobbying Disclosure Laws Breach a 
Core Value of the Petition Clause, 67 ALA. L. REV. 327, 342–46 (2015). 
108  See Magna Carta 1215, 16 John c. 61, reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 187, 187 (Philip B. 
Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987) (“[I]f we or our justiciar, or our bailiffs, or any of our servants shall 
have done wrong in any way toward any one . . . let [the] barons come to us . . . and let them ask that we 
cause that transgression to be corrected without delay.”). 
109  KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 16, at 85 (citing Professor William Stubbs’ extensive research on the practices 
and traditions of the English Crown in the high medieval period). 
110  Id. at 85–86 (“Parliament itself generally petitioned the Crown to establish a [new] law; it did not purport 
to make laws in its own name. Only later, and not until after Charles I gave his consent to the Petition 
of Right in 1628, did Parliament consistently enact bills on its own authority . . . .” (footnote omitted)). 
111  Id. at 86. 
112  See id. at 86–87 (citing WILLIAM R. ANSON, THE LAW AND CUSTOM OF THE CONSTITUTION 346–48 (2d ed. 
1892)) (documenting the work of the Committee of Grievances, which considered the vast array of 
petitions submitted to the House of Commons during the reigns of James I and Charles I). 
113  See ROBERT LUCE, LEGISLATIVE PRINCIPLES: THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF LAWMAKING BY REPRESENTATIVE 
GOVERNMENT 516–17 (1930) (discussing a 1669 enactment which made consideration of petitions an 
inherent governmental duty of the House of Commons). 
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citizens.114  It was enshrined in the English Bill of Rights and was frequently used as 
a method of redress for both private grievances and collective concerns.115 
 The idea that petitioning was a core democratic function was later exported to 
the American colonies, where it developed in unprecedented ways. Because North 
American settlements in the late seventeenth century were territorially disperse, 
direct petitioning by citizens became the most convenient method for legislators to 
keep a pulse on social needs.116 In many instances, individuals lobbied for regulations 
on local trades and professions, and community representatives stridently sought 
legislation on the sale of alcohol and lottery tickets.117 Colonial legislatures also 
considered petitions made by disenfranchised groups,118 and legislatures even 
accepted requests by lobbyists that advanced purely private interests.119  History tells 
us that the governor of New York was one of the first colonial officials to be subjected 
to this kind of organized petitioning by English merchants.120 But that example was 
not an isolated or anomalous political occurrence; in a concrete way, it shows that 
petitioning was alive across the American colonies. 
 Virginia, in particular, had a well-established petitioning culture, where 
powerful landed interests played the game of pressure politics.121 As early as the 
1710s, well-connected planters from the Chesapeake Bay lobbied Virginia authorities 
for “legislation . . . prohibiting the export of bulk tobacco from that colony, for 
regulation of the trade to prevent Scottish smuggling, for a long period of grace 
between the landing of tobacco and the paying of customs duties, and for the 
prevention of tobacco planting in England.”122 These lobbying tactics were also 
common in Pennsylvania, where religious groups wielded great influence. At the turn 
of the eighteenth century, Quaker lobbyists “worked for approval of a Pennsylvania 
act forbidding the importation of slaves, they supported the proprietorship as a form 
of government, they worked to keep the Three Lower Counties (now Delaware) part 
of Pennsylvania, [and] they backed the separation of New York and New Jersey . . . 
                                            
114  See KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 16, at 87 (“This growth in the importance and frequency of petitioning 
corresponds to the clearer demarcation of Parliament’s legislative power.”). 
115  Id. at 86–87. 
116  See RAYMOND C. BAILEY, POPULAR INFLUENCE UPON PUBLIC POLICY: PETITIONING IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY 
VIRGINIA 6 (1979) (underscoring that petitioning had been transplanted “literally during the first year of 
settlement at Jamestown, and by 1700 [it] had assumed an important role in the political process”). 
117  See MARY PATTERSON CLARKE, PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGE IN THE AMERICAN COLONIES 209–10 (1943). 
118  In 1769, a group of freed, black men lobbied the Virginia legislature to exempt their wives from a poll 
tax. See Gregory A. Mark, The Vestigial Constitution: The History and Significance of the Right to 
Petition, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2153, 2185 (1998) (noting that this campaign “was as incendiary an action 
as could be conceived in the slave South. All the more stunning, then, that the petition was not simply 
heard, but granted”). 
119  See id. at 2183 (studying the lobbying campaigns of two women in colonial Georgia on behalf of their 
families). 
120  See John D. Runcie, The Problem of Anglo-American Politics in Bellomont’s New York, 26 WM. & MARY 
Q. 191, 203 (1969) (highlighting the mercantile lobby’s influence on trade policy in colonial New York). 
121  See Alison G. Olson, The Virginia Merchants of London: A Study in Eighteenth-Century Interest-Group 
Politics, 40 WM. & MARY Q. 363, 368–70 (1989). 
122  Id. at 369. 
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.”123 The Quaker lobby was also active in New England, where it pressured the 
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Connecticut assemblies for a variety of impost 
exemptions.124 These provisions were extended in 1737, after the governor of 
Massachusetts was “waited upon” by Quaker lobbyists from London.125 
 These examples demonstrate that factional pressures were an accepted 
political reality in America by the 1770s. In fact, dissenters to the English Crown 
used those exact tactics to spark the cause of independence.126 American 
revolutionaries drew from the tradition of petitioning to craft their own political 
message.127 Their “Olive Branch” Petition of 1775 was essentially a lobbying effort on 
behalf of American interests to secure political outcomes in Britain (namely that the 
colonies be given free trade incentives by repealing laws like the Stamp Act).128 When 
these exhortations fell on deaf ears, the colonists found just cause for self-
determination: their right to be heard by the sovereign was nothing more than a 
formality.129 It was a rude awakening for those American colonists who believed they 
still had access to the British ruling class, and the frustration of that belief made 
petitioning an item of constitutional reform.130 
 Soon after independence, nine of the thirteen states adopted constitutions with 
sweeping protections for petitioning.131 For example, the Vermont Constitution of 
1777 gave its citizens “a right . . . to apply to the legislature for redress of grievances, 
by address, petition or remonstrance.”132 However, proposals for a more expansive 
federal right led to heated debate at the Constitutional Convention.133 Some delegates 
pushed for a right of the people to bind their representatives by “instruction,” but 
luminaries like James Madison disagreed.134 Madison believed that a right conferring 
                                            
123  Alison G. Olson, The Lobbying of London Quakers for Pennsylvania Friends, 117 PA. MAG. HIST. & 
BIOGRAPHY 131, 135 (1993). 
124  Kenneth L. Carroll, American Quakers and Their London Lobby, 70 QUAKER HIST. 22, 36 (1981). 
125  Id. at 38. 
126  See Don L. Smith, The Right to Petition for Redress of Grievances: Constitutional Development and 
Interpretation, at 57–66 (Aug. 1971) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Texas Tech University) (on file 
with author) (cataloguing the petitions filed with Parliament seeking redress of colonial wrongs inflicted 
by George III). 
127  See Alice Tanner Boyer, The “Olive Branch” Petition, 22 U. KAN. CITY L. REV. 183, 185 (1953–1954) 
(describing the heated debates over independence that led to a last-ditch plea to the King for peaceable 
redress). 
128  See John Dickson & Thomas Jefferson, The Olive Branch Petition, reprinted in Boyer, supra note 123, at 
189 (requesting that “measures be taken for preventing the further destruction of the lives of your 
Majesty’s subjects; and that such Statutes as more immediately distress any of your Majesty’s colonies 
be repealed . . . .”). 
129  Richard Penn ultimately delivered the Olive Branch Petition to the court of George III. See Boyer, supra 
note 123, at 186. It is unclear if the King personally reviewed the petition, but whether by happenstance 
or deliberate inattention, the document was left unanswered. Id. 
130  KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 16, at 108 (“To the colonists, the right to petition for redress of grievances (and 
the concomitant right to have one’s petition heard) was so fundamental that denial of the right was an 
act of tyranny and grounds for revolution.”). 
131  Mark, supra note 114, at 2199–203. 
132  VT. CONST. ch. 1, art. XVIII (1777). 
133  KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 16, at 109. 
134  Id. at 110. 
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only access to officials was consistent with the Anglo-American practice.135 Later, in 
Federalist No. 10, Madison noted that special interests “are sown in the nature of 
man,” and observed that democracy “involves the spirit of party and faction in the 
necessary and ordinary operations of the government.”136 
 Records from the First Congress show that Madison’s predictions were correct: 
petitioning had become an effective method for obtaining policy outcomes in the 
nascent republic.137 Within months of opening its doors, Congress received petitions 
from veterans, tradesmen, printers, and surveyors.138 Notable examples included a 
group of Boston blacksmiths seeking wartime backpay, as well as Philadelphia 
newspapermen demanding patent legislation.139 These and many other petitioners 
used blunt in-person tactics to lobby (e.g., by seeking out legislators in their daily 
activities to secure political promises).140 A good example of this approach was the 
antislavery campaign mounted by a well-funded and highly organized group of 
Quakers.141 In a show of force, members of the New York Yearly Meeting “wrote 
supplemental briefs for the committee considering [antislavery petitions], accosted 
members outside the doors of Congress, visited them at their lodgings, and invited 
them for meals, all the while making themselves conspicuous in the House galleries, 
looming over the proceedings like the specters of a guilty national conscience.”142 
 The Quaker effort was so successful in stirring up debate that many 
representatives became suspicious of the initiative.143 The report of the ad hoc 
committee on abolition voiced this concern, noting sourly that “every principle of 
policy and concern for the dignity of the House, and the peace and tranquility of the 
United States, concur to show the propriety of dropping the subject, and letting it 
sleep where it is.”144 However, with its back against the wall, the committee 
suggested: (1) taxing the importation of slaves, (2) issuing guidelines for humane 
                                            
135  Madison was able to convince his colleagues to drop the more expansive proposal. Id. (citing congressional 
records which indicate that the proposals for a right of instruction “fell by the wayside”). 
136  THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 78–79 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
137  For example, the first petition to arrive in the House of Representatives was a plea from the Baltimore 
business community seeking enactment of trade policies. See William C. diGiacomantonio, Petitioners 
and Their Grievances: A View from the First Federal Congress, in THE HOUSE AND SENATE IN THE 1790S: 
PETITIONING, LOBBYING, AND INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 29 (Kenneth R. Bowling & Donald R. Kennon 
eds., 2012). 
138  Jeffrey L. Pasley, Private Access and Public Power: Gentility and Lobbying in the Early Congress, in THE 
HOUSE AND SENATE IN THE 1790S: PETITIONING, LOBBYING, AND INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT, supra note 
127, at 62. This account of the initial flood of lobbying is particularly revealing, and is worth a close read 
for the history student. 
139  Id. 
140  Id. at 63–64 (“One suspects a good deal of loitering around taverns was involved, because in some 
cases . . . there is little evidence of extensive or meaningful contact with members of Congress.”). 
141  See William C. diGiacomantonio, For the Gratification of a Volunteering Society: Antislavery and Pressure 
Group Politics in the First Federal Congress, 15 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 169–97 (1995). 
142  Pasley, supra note 134, at 65. 
143  Id. at 66 (noting that the Quaker campaign was “unique in its openness, high degree of organization, and 
goal of effecting broad changes in government policy . . . .”). 
144  1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1472 (1790) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834), reprinted in KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 16, at 
111–12 (footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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treatment, and (3) banning the fitting of slave-trade vessels in American ports.145 
Although these policy recommendations were a far cry from banning slavery, they 
were still a victory for the Quaker lobbyists and their New York constituents. What 
is even more telling about this episode, however, is the fact that the committee’s 
complaints never engendered a backlash. As history indicates, this is because people 
of the day understood that direct and proximate petitioning was a fundamental right. 
 
B. Measuring the Harm: Procedural Barriers to Petitioning and the 
Analytical Quandary 
 
 These historical accounts are rich in and of themselves. But what do they tell 
us about the interests protected by the Petition Clause? And more to the point of this 
Article, how do procedural barriers in commission-driven redistricting intrude on 
those values? In his book, Professor Krotoszynski provides a sound answer to the first 
question: 
The history of the Petition Clause, including the history of its colonial and English 
antecedents, strongly suggests that the right to petition the government for a redress 
of grievances contemplates a right to do so in close proximity to the government officials 
to whom the petition is addressed. In other words, the Petition Clause of the First 
Amendment properly construed and applied, should guarantee would-be petitioners a 
right, exclusive of their speech and assembly freedoms, to seek redress of their 
grievances within both sight and hearing of those capable of giving redress.146 
 
Seizing on that observation, Professor Krotoszynski suggests that “courts should 
start from a presumption that favors the ability of ordinary citizens to engage their 
elected representatives, government officers, and party leaders.”147 Therefore, he 
argues, any “regulations that would remove [petitioners] from the sight or hearing of 
government officials” should be deemed “invalid absent a substantial justification 
supported by the record.”148 
 Using that framework to address the “pluralism problem” sketched in Part 
II.C, I now posit that procedural restraints in commission-driven redistricting 
presumptively breach the protective sphere of the Petition Clause. The argument is 
based on the reality that the ex parte contacts rule, by design, prevents citizens from 
getting within earshot of their redistricting officers.149 In states with independent 
commissions, this prohibition presents an acute problem because individuals have no 
alternative avenues (short of filing a lawsuit) for directly participating in electoral 
                                            
145  KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 16, at 112 (cataloguing the various policy proposals referred to the floor of the 
House of Representatives). Professor Krotoszynski characterizes this outcome as a political success, 
noting that “despite the vehement objections of Southern members of the House, the members considered, 
debated, and responded on the merits to the petitions seeking abolition of the slave trade.” Id. 
146  Id. at 154–155 (emphasis added). 
147  Id. at 168 (observing that this presumption best serves the concept of self-government highlighted in 
ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 24–26 (1948)). 
148  KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 16, at 156. 
149  See supra notes 81–83 and accompanying text. 
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design.150 In those systems, therefore, constituents can only interact with the 
mapmakers in the most formal and rehearsed of circumstances—a fact which 
sterilizes public input and prevents consensus building.151 As a conceptual matter, 
that outcome falls short of the advocacy-in-close-proximity value enshrined in the 
Petition Clause.152 And, since the ex parte contacts rule preserves that specific status 
quo, there is little doubt that the First Amendment is implicated. 
The remaining question, then, is how a court might apply Professor 
Krotoszynski’s presumption by way of existing doctrine. Regrettably, because the 
Supreme Court has relegated the Petition Clause to second-class status, there is no 
direct answer to that question.153 Even a cursory examination of the cases that have 
addressed petitioning reveals their limited utility here. 
 The Court first discussed the Petition Clause in 1867, almost a century after it 
was ratified as part of the Bill of Rights.154 At first, there were indications that the 
Clause might be given independent constitutional effect,155 but those aspirations 
were quickly extinguished. Instead, the Court began insisting that the right of 
petition could only be invoked if it was exercised in combination with other expressive 
freedoms.156 That approach led to the unfortunate fiction that deprivations of access 
to government could (and should) be decided on other First Amendment grounds.157 
Worse yet, this inattention to the Petition Clause’s history and purpose led the Court 
                                            
150  Sadly, this is not a hypothetical observation. Just one Term after the Arizona Legislature case was 
litigated, the Arizona redistricting commission returned to the Supreme Court to defend its plans against 
partisan gerrymandering claims. See Amy Howe, Argument Analysis: Justices Hard to Read on Arizona 
Redistricting Plan, SCOTUSBLOG (Dec. 8, 2015, 5:41 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/12/argument-
analysis-justices-hard-to-read-on-arizona-redistricting-plan/. As of this writing, the Court has not yet 
ruled on the appeal from the district court. See Harris v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 993 F. Supp. 
2d 1042 (D. Ariz. 2014). The Supreme Court ruled on the appeal from the district court on April 20, 2016. 
See Harris v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 136 S. Ct. 1301 (2016). 
151  See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
152  Cf. Carol Rice Andrews, A Right of Access to Court Under the Petition Clause of the First Amendment: 
Defining the Right, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 557, 624 (1999) (“The right to petition guarantees the right to speak 
to a particular body of persons, those comprising the government. This targeted speech serves values not 
achieved by general speech. It gives citizens a better chance at having their voices heard by the very public 
servants who are making the decisions in government. People do not have to wait or hope that their views 
will be channeled by the press or others to the government” (emphasis added)). 
153  KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 16, at 156 (“The Supreme Court has, for almost all intents and purposes, 
simply subsumed and merged the Petition Clause into the rights of speech, assembly, and association”). 
154  Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 44 (1867) (noting that a citizen “has the right to come to the 
seat of government to assert any claim he may have upon that government, or to transact any business 
he may have with it. To seek its protection, to share its offices, to engage in administering its functions”). 
155  See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1875) (“The very idea of a government, republican in 
form, implies a right of its citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs and to 
petition for a redress of grievances”). 
156  Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945) (“It was not by accident or coincidence that the rights to 
freedom in speech and press were coupled in a single guaranty with the rights of the people peaceably to 
assemble and petition for redress of grievances. All these, though not identical, are inseparable” 
(emphasis added)). 
157  See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 610 n.11 (1985) (“Although the right to petition and the right 
to free speech are separate guarantees, they are related and generally subject to the same constitutional 
analysis” (emphasis added)). 
2016] Drawing the Line for Democratic Choice 97 
 
 
 
to render a grossly misinformed decision that struck a reeling blow to the right.158 
Since then, litigants have seldom dared to invoke the Petition Clause in its 
independent capacity.159 In fact, the only time they have successfully done so was in 
the antitrust context. However, for purposes of my analysis, even these precedents 
provide scant guidance. 
Arising from two Supreme Court cases, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine relies 
on the Petition Clause to grant absolute immunity from antitrust liability for lobbying 
activities that have anticompetitive effects.160  Particularly in Eastern Railroad 
Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., the Court seemed to grasp the 
urgency of letting constituents petition without fear of retaliation.161 In his majority 
opinion, Justice Black noted that democracy “depends upon the ability of the people 
to make their wishes known to their representatives. To hold that the government 
retains the power to act in this representative capacity and yet hold, at the same 
time, that the people cannot freely inform the government of their wishes would” 
create serious institutional problems.162 Relying on that principle, the Court 
concluded that it was permissible for a railroad company to wage a mass media 
campaign aimed at passing legislation harmful to its competitors.163 
That disposition, of course, is in line with our historical understanding of 
Petition Clause protections.164 However, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine provides 
little in the way of a doctrinal rubric for analyzing procedural barriers to the right of 
petition. It also does not help that Noerr dealt with indirect petitioning—which is 
                                            
158  In McDonald v. Smith, the Court held that the Petition Clause did not afford citizens immunity from 
libel suits for statements made in petitions. 472 U.S. 479, 484 (1985). It reasoned that the right of petition 
is “cut from the same cloth as the other [First Amendment] guarantees.” Id. at 482. Thus, “there is no 
sound basis for granting greater constitutional protection to statements made in a petition to the 
President than other First Amendment expressions.” Id. at 485. But see KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 16, at 
158 (“What the [McDonald] Court failed to recognize was that through its history, the Petition Clause 
virtually demands special First Amendment status”); Eric Schnapper, “Libelous” Petitions for Redress of 
Grievances—Bad Historiography Makes Worse Law, 74 IOWA L. REV. 303, 343–45 (1989) (demonstrating 
that petitioning had always enjoyed broad immunity from suit, and that it was conceptually distinct from 
freedom of speech). 
159  Even in cases where petitioning rights are squarely abridged by lobbying regulation, litigants have opted 
against a pure Petition Clause theory. See Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Taylor, 582 F.3d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 2009) 
(quoting the petitioner’s brief for the position that “the disclosures mandated . . . will discourage and 
deter speech, petitioning, and expressive association”); Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 26, Nat’l Ass’n of 
Mfrs. v. Taylor, 582 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (No. 08-5085); Forero, supra note 103, at 338–39. 
160  E.R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961); United Mine Workers v. 
Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965). In recent years, litigants have sought to extend the holdings in these 
cases beyond the antitrust context. See GEORGE W. PRING & PENELOPE CANAN, SLAPPS: GETTING SUED 
FOR SPEAKING OUT 8 (1996) (cataloguing different kinds of retaliation lawsuits that violate the right of 
petition). 
161  365 U.S. at 138 (“The right of petition is one of the freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights, and we 
cannot, of course, lightly impute to Congress an intent to invade these freedoms”). 
162  Id. at 137–38. 
163  Id. at 145 (“In this particular instance, each group appears to have utilized all the political powers it 
could muster in an attempt to bring about the passage of laws that would help it or injure the other . . . . 
[T]hat [deceptive effort], reprehensible as it is, can be of no consequence so far as the Sherman Act is 
concerned”). 
164  See supra notes 115, 117, 133 and accompanying text. 
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materially different from the type of proximate participation abridged by the ex parte 
contacts rule.165 Therefore, in order to extract a meaningful legal test for Petition 
Clause analysis, it is necessary to look elsewhere in the First Amendment for 
inspiration. This approach might seem academic, but it has actually been endorsed 
by the Supreme Court. In Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri the Court noted that: 
 
[T]he rights of speech and petition share substantial common ground. This Court has 
said that the right to speak and the right to petition are ‘cognate rights’ . . . . Both 
speech and petition are integral to the democratic process, although not necessarily in 
the same way. The right to petition allows citizens to express their ideas, hopes, and 
concerns to their government and their elected representatives, whereas the right to 
speak fosters the public exchange of ideas that is integral to deliberative democracy . . 
. .166 
 
Accordingly, since the Speech and Petition Clauses are at least analogues, it seems 
prudent to use that branch of doctrine to inform the present constitutional analysis. 
As it turns out, one line of the Speech Clause cases furnishes an appropriate 
methodology for safeguarding a right of “proximate petitioning.” 
C. Applying the Test: Protecting Redistricting Petitions Through the Public 
Access Principle 
 
 In a series of decisions between 1980 and 1986, the Supreme Court announced 
that the First Amendment—through the Speech and Press Clauses—implies a right 
of public access to court proceedings.167 Relevant to this Article, those cases 
articulated a test that defines when a barrier to governmental access becomes 
constitutionally impermissible. 
 The foundation for this “public access” test was laid out in Richmond 
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, where the Court declared for the first time that citizens 
possess an enforceable right to observe criminal trials.168 In a plurality opinion 
                                            
165  KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 16, at 161 (“Justice Black’s opinion does not link a mass media campaign—or 
other forms of indirect petitioning—to the traditional exercise of the right, which involved direct 
communication between a group of petitioners, on the one hand, and a legislator or an executive branch 
official, on the other. It is certainly true that this sort of indirect petitioning seems rather far removed 
from the historical paradigm of petitioning, which involved, quite literally, laying a petition at the foot of 
the throne”). 
166  No. 09-1476, slip. op. at 7 (U.S. June 20, 2011) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). In 
Guarnieri, the Court considered whether the Petition Clause protects public employees from retaliation 
by their supervisors for grievances lodged against them. Id. at 1. Ultimately, the Court held that §1983 
suits of this kind should be judged under the Speech Clause’s “public concern” test. Id. at 5. To reach that 
conclusion, the Court reaffirmed McDonald v. Smith’s flawed logic of commingled expressive rights. Id. 
at 8; see supra note 154 and accompanying text. However, as the passage I quoted above suggests, the 
Court did leave space for analogizing from Speech Clause precedent to create new doctrine specific to the 
Petition Clause. 
167  For an in-depth overview of these cases and their antecedents, see Edward J. Klaris, David A. Schulz et 
al., “If it Walks, Talks and Squawks . . . .” The First Amendment Right of Access to Administrative 
Adjudications: A Position Paper, 23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 21 (2005). 
168  448 U.S. 555, 579–80 (1980). 
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authored by Chief Justice Burger, the Court traced the history of criminal trials from 
the Norman Conquest of England to Colonial America.169 Using that backdrop, the 
Court found that “throughout its evolution, the trial has been open to all who cared 
to observe.”170 Therefore, the presumption of openness “is no quirk of history; rather, 
it has long been recognized as an indispensable attribute” of due process.171 In a 
concurring opinion, Justice Brennan went beyond the historical record to underscore 
the “structural role” that the First Amendment plays “in securing . . . our republican 
system of self-government.”172 On this point, he noted that a First Amendment right 
of access supports “not only ‘the principle that debate on public issues should be 
uninhibited, robust and wide-open,’ but also the antecedent assumption that valuable 
public debate—as well as other civic behavior—must be informed.”173 
 Two years later, in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, the Court 
reaffirmed its commitment to the Richmond Newspapers holding.174 Led by Justice 
Brennan, the Court held that a statute requiring closed proceedings during the 
testimony of rape victims breached the First Amendment.175 In so concluding, the 
Court endorsed the theory that public access promotes the “free discussion of 
governmental affairs.”176 It reasoned that any abridgment of that interest should be 
subjected to strict scrutiny. In other words, the government must prove that 
mandatory closure of a proceeding “is necessitated by a compelling governmental 
interest and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.”177 Applying the standard, the 
Court found that the interest in shielding rape victims from press scrutiny—though 
strong—“does not justify a mandatory closure rule.”178 Nonetheless, the Court noted, 
“the circumstances of the particular case may affect the significance of the [openness] 
interest.”179 
 Finally, in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, the Court extended strict 
scrutiny protection outside the criminal context.180 In the first phase of litigation, the 
                                            
169  Id. at 564–69 (citing MATHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 343–45 (6th ed. 1820) 
and 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *372–73). 
170  Id. at 564. 
171  Id. at 569. On that point, the Court also noted that “without the freedom to attend [criminal] trials, which 
people have exercised for centuries, important aspects of freedom of speech and of the press could be 
eviscerated.” Id. at 580 (internal quotations omitted). 
172  Id. at 587 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
173  Id. at 587 (Brennan, J., concurring). In the same breath, Justice Brennan also cautioned that this 
rationale could produce “theoretically endless” justification for governmental access. Id. at 588. To 
mitigate this problem, he suggested that an assertion of the right must be weighed against its effect on 
the integrity of the proceeding. Id. at 589. 
174  457 U.S. 596, 604 (1982). 
175  Id. at 610–11. 
176  Id. at 604–05. 
177  Id. at 606–07. 
178  Id. at 607–08. 
179  Id. The Court recalled that a “flexible” application of the compelling-interest rubric was justified—
especially since “the plurality opinion in Richmond Newspapers suggested that individualized 
determinations are always required before the right of access may be denied.” Id. at 608 n.20. 
180  The case was actually litigated on two different occasions in front of the Supreme Court. See Press-
Enterprise Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal. for the County of Riverside, 464 U.S. 501 (1984) [hereinafter Press-
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Court held that its Richmond Newspapers holding applied to jury voir dire.181 And in 
the second phase, it held that the First Amendment also attached to preliminary 
hearings—even though they had no particularly strong analogue in history.182 To 
explain this decision, the Court read its cases as creating one single frame of analysis. 
Specifically, it prescribed that a court may extend the right of public access whenever 
“tradition” or “structural benefits” call for it.183 Thus, because openness in 
preliminary hearings was “structurally beneficial,” a lack of historical antecedents 
could not save the closure rule.184 
By combining the Richmond Newspapers and Globe Newspaper holdings in this 
manner, the Press-Enterprise Court created a convenient test for the lower courts to 
apply.185 Following that test, a court considering when to keep a proceeding closed 
must examine: (1) whether public access to the proceeding has been traditionally 
granted and (2) whether “public access plays a significant positive role in the 
functioning of the particular process in question.”186 If both questions are answered 
in the affirmative, or if one answer carries a strong affirmative presumption, the 
court may not close the proceeding. Only a compelling interest could justify the 
closure—and even then, the government must show that the barrier it has erected is 
narrowly tailored to meet it.187 
 For purposes of the present Petition Clause analysis, the Press-Enterprise test 
seems useful. Conveniently, it answers the question of when a procedural restraint 
cannot block citizens from engaging (through observation or participation) in 
democratic functions. Indeed, applying the Press-Enterprise analysis to the ex parte 
                                            
Enterprise I]; Press-Enterprise Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 478 U.S. 1 (1986) [hereinafter Press-Enterprise 
II]. 
181  Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 507–09, and see Klaris, Schultz et al., supra note 163, at 34 (“Writing for 
the unanimous Court, Chief Justice Burger analyzed the structural benefits of open voir dire proceedings, 
reinforcing past findings that public proceedings enhance the basic fairness of the process, create an 
appearance of fairness that is essential to public confidence, and offer cathartic value”). 
182   Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 10–11 (“Although grand jury proceedings have traditionally been closed 
to the public and the accused, preliminary hearings conducted before neutral and detached magistrates 
have been open to the public. Long ago in the celebrated trial of Aaron Burr for treason, for example, 
with Chief Justice Marshall sitting as trial judge, the probable-cause hearing was held in the Hall of the 
House of Delegates in Virginia, the courtroom being too small to accommodate the crush of interested 
citizens” (citing United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 1 (C.C.D. Ky. 1806)). 
183  Id. at 9 (“Considerations of experience and logic are, of course, related, for history and experience shape 
the functioning of governmental processes. If the particular proceeding . . . passes these tests of 
experience and logic, a qualified First Amendment right of public access attaches”). 
184  Id. at 15. 
185  Indeed, the test is so versatile that it has been applied to a vast array of contexts including civil and 
bankruptcy proceedings. See, e.g., Rushford v. New Yorker Mag., 846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir. 1988); 
Publicker Indus. Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1061 (3d Cir. 1984); Westmoreland v. CBS, 752 F.2d 16, 
23 (2d Cir. 1984); In re Cont’l Ill. Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302, 1308 (7th Cir. 1984); Newman v. Graddick, 
696 F.2d 796, 802 (11th Cir. 1983); In re Symington, 209 B.R. 678, 692–94 (Bankr. D. Md. 1997); In re 
Vance, 176 B.R. 772, 778 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1995); In re Astri Inv. Mgmt. & Sec. Corp., 88 B.R. 730, 741 
(Bankr. D. Md. 1988). 
186  Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 8. 
187  See Klaris et al., supra note 163, at 36 (“The First Amendment right of access is a qualified, not absolute, 
right. The qualified right to attend a government proceeding may be overcome where there is a showing 
of a countervailing, transcendent interest requiring closure.”). 
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contacts rule reveals that substantive citizen participation in commission-driven 
redistricting would carry immense “structural benefits.” To understand why, consider 
one case that has used Press-Enterprise to hold administrative proceedings open. 
In Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
reviewed a challenge to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) 
regulations, which forbade public access to “special interest” deportation hearings.188 
Finding that the administrative rule was in breach of the First Amendment, the court 
offered a ringing endorsement of openness as a check on government abuse.189 
Applying the Press-Enterprise test, the court concluded that public access to INS 
proceedings (1) ensured “fairly and properly” conducted hearings,190 (2) improved 
government performance and accuracy,191 (3) had a “cathartic” effect on the 
community,192 (4) gave a “perception of integrity and fairness,”193 and (5) promoted a 
more informed public.194 Because those structural benefits were so compelling, the 
requirement that openness be historically supported was analytically less 
important.195 The court, therefore, subjected the INS rule to strict scrutiny and found 
that the government’s interest in confidentiality was not narrowly tailored.196  
Aside from validating the Press-Enterprise test in the administrative 
context,197 the Sixth Circuit’s “structural benefit” explanations are revealing.  
Although the five rationales were found in the ambit of immigration hearings, a court 
could easily find that they apply with equal force in the redistricting context. 
                                            
188  See 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002). The case arose from the government’s “special interest” prosecution of 
a Muslim man in Detroit who had overstayed his tourist visa. Id. at 683–85. 
189  Id. at 683 (“The Executive Branch seeks to uproot people’s lives, outside the public eye, and behind a 
closed door. Democracies die behind closed doors. The First Amendment, through a free press, protects 
the people’s right to know that their government acts fairly, lawfully, and accurately in deportation 
proceedings. When government begins closing doors, it selectively controls information rightfully 
belonging to the people. Selective information is misinformation”). 
190  Id. at 703–04 (“In an area such as immigration, where the government has nearly unlimited authority, 
the press and the public serve as perhaps the only check on abusive government practices.”). 
191  Id. at 704 (“Congressional oversight hearings . . . can do little to correct past [mistakes]. In contrast, 
openness at the hearings can allow mistakes to be cured at once.” (quoting Soc’y of Prof’l. Journalists v. 
Sec’y of Labor, 616 F. Supp. 569, 575–76 (D. Utah 1985)). 
192  Id. (“It is important for the public, particularly individuals who feel that they are being targeted by the 
Government as a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11, to know that even during these sensitive 
times the Government is adhering to immigration procedures and respecting individuals’ rights.” 
(quoting the district court below)). 
193  Id. (“The most stringent safeguards for a deportee ‘would be of limited worth if the public is not persuaded 
that the standards are being fairly enforced. Legitimacy rests in large part on public understanding.’” 
(quoting First Amendment Coal. v. Judicial Inquiry & Review Bd., 784 F.2d 467, 486 (3d Cir. 1986) 
(Adams, J., concurring)). 
194  Id. at 704–05 (“Public access to deportation proceedings helps inform the public of the affairs of the 
government. Direct knowledge of how their government is operating enhances the public’s ability to 
affirm or protest government’s efforts.”). 
195  Id. at 700 (The court rejected an argument that the tradition of openness in a hearing must date back to 
the time “when our organic laws were adopted.” Indeed, it observed, Press-Enterprise II had “relied on 
exclusively post-Bill of Rights history.”). 
196  Id. at 705–07. 
197  Accord Klaris et al., supra note 163, at 63 (“Due process obligations and a history of openness dating from 
the advent of the administrative state lead to the inexorable conclusion that the First Amendment’s 
presumptive right of access attaches to administrative adjudicatory proceedings.”). 
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Consider, for example, how each benefit would play out if commission-erected 
procedural barriers were struck down. First, allowing ex parte contacts with 
commissioners would foster “fair and proper” redistricting by ensuring that citizen 
feedback is incorporated into the electoral plan.198 Second, ex parte contacts with 
redistricting officials would improve “government performance” by increasing the 
upstream flow of policy information related to line drawing.199 Third, permitting ex 
parte contacts would be “cathartic” for citizens who might otherwise feel blocked out 
of the redistricting debate (especially in states like Arizona and California).200 Fourth, 
allowing ex parte contacts would foster “perceptions of integrity” by making unelected 
commissioners seem approachable.201 And fifth, the incidence of ex parte contacts 
would create a more “informed public” by permitting commissioners to answer 
constituent-specific questions about a redistricting plan.202 
Stepping back, the Detroit Free Press factors make clear that ex parte contacts 
are a necessary ingredient for “proximate petitioning.” This is an alarming conclusion 
given that virtually all redistricting commissions prohibit off-the-record 
communications. However, by invoking the Petition Clause to remove that procedural 
barrier, a court could reverse the harm to pluralism inflicted by the recent shift to 
commission-based redistricting.203 In Press-Enterprise parlance, re-democratizing 
electoral design would create significant “structural benefits.” Importantly, it would 
restore the Framers’ preference for a consensus model of redistricting, and it would 
countermand any negative consequences from the Supreme Court’s ruling in Arizona 
Legislature.204 Because these functional benefits are specific and articulable, the 
“history” prong of Press-Enterprise becomes an ancillary (albeit equally well-
documented) consideration.205 Therefore, a court applying the test should be prepared 
to invalidate the ex parte contacts rule under strict scrutiny analysis.206 
CONCLUSION: BROADER IMPLICATIONS? 
 
 The foregoing discussions show that procedural hurdles in the redistricting 
process may raise grave constitutional problems. At the same time, my analysis of 
how the ex parte contacts rule abridges petitioning is merely illustrative. At one level 
of abstraction, the First Amendment framework I present may also be useful for 
                                            
198  See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
199  See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
200  See supra notes 81–83 and accompanying text. 
201  See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
202  See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
203  See supra notes 88–90 and accompanying text. 
204  See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
205  See supra note 191 and accompanying text. Notwithstanding that conclusion, there is little ground to 
argue that ex parte contacts have not traditionally been part of the redistricting process. To the contrary, 
it is their very incidence that fueled the redistricting reform movement. 
206  One unanswered question is whether a redistricting-specific government interest can save the ex parte 
contacts rule. That assessment is beyond the scope of this Article, but we can surmise that a compelling 
justification with strong factual support will be required. See Ronald K.L. Collins, Exceptional Freedom—
The Roberts Court, The First Amendment, and the New Absolutism, 76 ALB. L. REV. 409, 413 (2012–13) 
(surveying the Court’s “new absolutist” approach to the First Amendment). 
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scrutinizing other rules that dilute access to commission-driven redistricting. At two 
levels of abstraction, my argument that procedural barriers abridge petitioning rights 
may be revealing in other policy areas outside of redistricting. And at three levels of 
abstraction, the idea that the Petition Clause provides an independent source of 
constitutional protection may be a boon to jurisprudence in the ambit of expressive 
freedom. Aside from those figurative conclusions, however, this Article seeks to make 
a more basic contribution. Fundamentally, presents one method by which courts can 
harness the Constitution to restore the Framers’ vision for a pluralist electoral 
system. In no unclear terms, this Article draws a line in the sand for democratic 
choice. 
